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Abstract
We call a probabilistic theory “complete” if it cannot be further refined by no-signaling hidden-variable
models, and name a theory “spooky” if every equivalent hidden-variable model violates Shimony’s Outcome
Independence. We prove that a complete theory is spooky if and only if it admits a pure steering state in
the sense of Schro¨dinger. Finally we show that steering of complementary states leads to a Schro¨dinger’s
cat-like paradox.
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1. Introduction
Since the early days physicists have been won-
dering whether Quantum Theory (QT) can be con-
sidered complete [1, 2], or more refined theories
compatible with quantum predictions could exist.
These models, also known as Hidden Variable The-
ories (HVT), reproduce QT thanks to a statistical
definition of pure quantum states, which are ob-
tained as averages over the more fundamental states
of the HVT. In this approach, which reduces QT
to a Statistical Mechanics, many results have been
obtained, such as the theorems by Kochen-Specker
and Bell [3, 4], and the results by Conway-Kochen
on the free will [5, 6].
Recently, General Probabilistic Theories (GPT)
have received great attention as the appropriate
framework to study foundational aspects of physics
[7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13]. Despite much work has
been devoted to the relations between probabilistic
theories and HVTs, these results are mostly a char-
acterization of the probability measures, lacking a
conceptual physical characterization of the theory
itself, for example in terms of axioms. So far there
exist examples of probability measures that do not
respect locality, signaling, non-contextuality, deter-
minism, completeness, etc., but none of these high-
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lights the physical properties that a GPT must ful-
fill in order to achieve such violations.
The present Letter breaks the ground in the di-
rection of providing a characterization theorem for
complete “spooky” theories (see definitions in the
following). Roughly speaking, the spookiness of a
complete theory is the apparent “action at a dis-
tance” due to outcome correlations [14]. We show
that spookiness for complete theories is equivalent
to Schro¨dinger’s steering property [15, 16]. We
do not discuss the completeness assumption since
an exhaustive inquiry would require a much more
complicate analysis, comparable to a generalized
Bell theorem for GPTs. Finally, we use the re-
sults about spookiness to prove that complemen-
tarity and steering are necessary and sufficient con-
ditions to raise a Schro¨dinger’s cat-like paradox.
2. Hidden variable theories for a GPT
The most important feature of a given prob-
abilistic theory—such as QT or more generally
any GPT—is the probability rule that links the
various elements of the theory itself. More pre-
cisely, given a state ρ, a group of observers for
the theory (A,B,C, . . . ) and the measurements
a, b, c, . . . that A,B,C, . . . perform, the probabil-
ity rule Pr[ai, bj , ck, . . . | a, b, c, . . . ρ] is defined for
every possible outcome ai, bj , ck, . . . over a suitable
sample space Ω. In the remainder of the Letter, we
will drop the explicit dependence of all probablity
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rules on the state ρ. We can now define a hidden
variable description for the previous model as fol-
lows.
Definition 1 (Hidden Variable Theory). An equiv-
alent HVT for a GPT is given by a set Λ ∋ λ, and
a probability rule P˜r[·| ·] on Ω× Λ, such that [17]
Pr[ai, bj, ck, . . . | a, b, c, . . . ] = (1)∑
λ
P˜r[ai, bj , ck, . . . | a, b, c, . . . , λ] P˜r[λ| a, b, c, . . . ] .
for every state of the GPT.
In the following we will restrict our attention to
HVTs satisfying two requirements: λ-independence,
namely P˜r[λ| a, b, c, . . . ] = P˜r[λ], i.e. λ is an objec-
tive parameter independent of the choice of mea-
surements 2; and parameter independence, namely
P˜r[ai| a, b, c, . . . , λ] = P˜r[ai| a, λ] and similarly for
b, c, . . . , i.e. the HVT is no-signaling. Clearly, given
a GPT, without these two restrictions we can al-
ways build an equivalent deterministic HVT which
is signaling, and denies observers’ free choice [17].
A GPT is complete if every equivalent HVT pro-
vides no further descriptive detail. Besides classi-
cal probability theory, there is at least a GPT that
is complete in the present sense, which is indeed
Quantum Theory, as proved recently by Colbeck
and Renner in Ref. [19].
It is now crucial to require that probabilities de-
pend non-trivially on the hidden variable.
Definition 2 (Descriptively significant HVT). A
HVT is descriptively significant for an equivalent
GPT if it satisfies λ-independence and parameter
independence, and there exists a pure state and
measurements a, b, . . . , ai, bj , . . . such that for some
λ, λ′ ∈ Λ with P˜r[ai, bj, . . . | a, b, . . . , λ] 6= 0, one has
P˜r[ai, bj , . . . | a, b, . . . , λ] 6= P˜r[ai, bj, . . . | a, b, . . . , λ
′] .
(2)
Definition 3 (Complete GPT). A GPT is com-
plete if every equivalent HVT is not descriptively
significant.
The reason why it is important to investigate
only descriptively significant HVTs is the following.
2Notice that a realistic theory where λ is correlated with
the observers’ choices could in principle be considered, how-
ever such a theory would be necessarily ad hoc, and even
more puzzling than its original GPT [18].
Given a non significant HVT for a given GPT, for
all pure states and all a, b, . . . , ai, bj , . . . , we have
that, by Eq.(2) and Eq.(1)
Pr[ai, bj , . . . | a, b, . . . ] = P˜r[ai, bj, . . . | a, b, . . . , λi] ,
(3)
for all λi ∈ Λ such that P˜r[ai, bj , . . . | a, b, . . . , λi] 6=
0. Therefore, we conclude that
P˜r[ai, bj, . . . | a, b, . . . , λi] shares all the fea-
tures of Pr[ai, bj, . . . | a, b, . . . ], e.g. non locality or
complementarity.
Given a GPT, among all HVTs equivalent to it
and not descriptively significant, there is one theory
that enjoys the so-called “single-valuedness prop-
erty” [17].
Definition 4 (Single-valuedness). A HVT satisfies
the single-valuedness property if |Λ| = 1.
For a HVT with single-valuedness there exists
only one hidden variable value λ0, whence for every
i and j, Pr[ai, bj| a, b] ≡ P˜r[ai, bj | a, b, λ0]. Given a
GPT there is always an equivalent hidden variable
model which satisfies single-valuedness [17]: this
fact recalls the intuition that QT can be regarded
itself as a HVT, where the hidden variable role is
played by the quantum state. If we want to study
a complete probabilistic theory it is useful to refer
to the simplest non descriptively significant equiv-
alent hidden variable model, that is the one which
satisfies single-valuedness.
Thanks to J. P. Jarrett [20], it is known that
the Bell locality [3] is equivalent to the conjunction
of two different properties: the aforementioned Pa-
rameter Independence and the Shimony’s so-called
Outcome Independence [21]. Parameter indepen-
dence corresponds to the property of “no-signaling
without exchange of physical systems” in [9] for
GPTs, while Outcome Independence can be stated
as the factorizability of joint probabilities, i.e. 3
P˜r[ai, bj | a, b, λ] = P˜r[ai| a, b, λ]× P˜r[bj | a, b, λ] .
(4)
3The usual definition of Outcome independence in the
literature is the following. A probabilistic HVT satis-
fies the outcome independence property if and only if
∀a, b, c, . . . , ai, bj , ck, . . . , λ on
Pr[ai|a, b, c, . . . , bj , ck, . . . , λ] = Pr[ai|a, b, c, . . . , λ],
Pr[bj |a, b, c, . . . , bj , ck, . . . , λ] = Pr[bj |a, b, c, . . . , λ],
Pr[ck|a, b, c, . . . , bj , ck, . . . , λ] = Pr[ck|a, b, c, . . . , λ],
and so on. One can easily prove that this definition is equiv-
alent to Eq. (4).
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Notice that the previous definition can be applied
to a general GPT, regarded as a single-valued HVT.
The EPR paradox can be rewritten in the fol-
lowing similar way [22, 17]: quantum predictions
are not compatible with any equivalent non descrip-
tively significant HVT which satisfies Outcome In-
dependence. For this reason, according to EPR,
QT presents a spooky action at a distance. We now
want to extend the EPR result, namely: which are
the GPTs that present this spooky flavor? First
we must define in what sense a theory can present
spooky features.
Definition 5 (Spooky theory). A GPT is spooky
if it violates outcome independence on a pure state
and every equivalent descriptively significant HVT
does so.
From now on, we will focus on complete spooky
GPTs, unless told otherwise.
3. Review of general probabilistic theories
Before starting we need to introduce the usual
notation for GPTs. For a detailed discussion see [7].
The symbols ρA, |ρ)A and
 '!&ρ A denote the state
ρ for system A, representing the information about
the system initialization, including the probability
that such preparation can occur. The set of the
states of a given system A is a (truncated) positive
cone, and therefore given the states {ρi}i∈η for A,
every their convex combination belongs to the cone
of the states of A. The extremal rays of the cone—
namely the states which cannot be seen as a convex
combination of other ones—are the so called pure
states.
Similarly, ciA, (ci|A and
A "%#$ci mean the effect
ci for system A or, in more practical terms, the i-th
outcome of the test (measurement) c = {ci}i∈η on
systemA. Given a system A, its effects are bounded
linear positive functionals from the states of A to
[0, 1] ⊂ R, and therefore they belong to the dual
cone of the cone of the states. The application of
the effect ci on the state ρ is written as (ci|ρ)A or '!&ρ A "%#$ci , and it means the probability that the
outcome of measure c performed on the state ρ of
system A is ci, i.e. (ci|ρ)A := Pr[ci| c]. In the fol-
lowing we will not specify the system when it is
clear from the context or it is generic.
The symbol eA will denote a deterministic effect
for system A, namely a measurement with a single
outcome. For any state σ, the symbol (e|σ) denotes
its preparation probability within a test includ-
ing a measurement {ci}i∈η such that e =
∑
i∈η ci.
A state σ is deterministic if we know with cer-
tainty that it has been prepared in any test, whence
(e|σ) = 1 for every deterministic effect e. An en-
semble is a collection of (possibly non-deterministic)
states {αi}i∈η such that ρ :=
∑
i∈η αi is determinis-
tic. A GPT is causal (i.e. it satisfies the no-signaling
from the future axiom [7]) iff the deterministic effect
is unique. Thanks to this last feature, in a causal
GPT the preparation probability for the state σ is
well defined since it is independent of the tests fol-
lowing the preparation. For this reason, for every
state ρ we can always consider the deterministic
state ρ¯ := (e|ρ)ρ, or, in other words, in a causal
theory evey state is proportional to a deterministic
one. In the following, we will consider a general
causal GPT.
4. Spookiness, steering and completeness
In this section we will show our main results. Let
ρ be a joint deterministic state for systems A and
B. Let a0, a1 be two effects for A forming a so-
called complete test : namely, for every state σ of A
we have (a0|σ) + (a1|σ) = (e|σ). Similarly, let the
effects b0, b1 form a complete test for B. Let us
define the following useful shorthand
pij := Pr[ai, bj | a, b] ≡ ρ
?>
89
A "%#$ai
B 2534bj
. (5)
The number pij represents the probability that Al-
ice and Bob obtain respectively the i-th and the j-
th outcome while performing measurements a and
b on the state ρ.
Under these assumptions the following theorems
hold.
Theorem 1. A complete GPT is spooky if and only
if there exists a pure state ρ of AB and tests {a0, a1}
of A and {b0, b1} of B such that the probabilities pij
of Eq. (5) satisfy the following constraint:
p00 p11 6= p01p10. (6)
Proof. A complete GPT is spooky iff it has a test
{a0, a1} for system A, a test {b0, b1} for system B,
and pure state ρ for AB such that pij is not factor-
ized. This is equivalent to the requirement that the
matrix pij has rank larger than one, namely for a
2 × 2 matrix the determinant of the matrix is non
vanishing, i.e. Eq. (6) holds. 
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Figure 1: The tetrahedron (outlined in thick black line) rep-
resents the set of possible values of probabilities p00, p01,
p10 satisfying the normalization condition. The hyperbolic
paraboloid identifies the probabilities that satisfy Outcome
Independence.
The theorem states that if we describe by a pure
state of a GPT an experiment with probabilities
given by Eq.(6), then we can not provide a local
explanation for the observed physical phenomenon.
Notice that the previous result does not man-
ifestly require any choice by the observers, since
it needs only one test for each subsystem. Conse-
quently, there are no explicit assumptions about the
observers’ free will, thus extending Brandenburger–
Yanofsky’s reformulation of the EPR paradox [17].
One may wonder how such non-locality can be
proved without observers’ choice between “comple-
mentary” measurements. The answer resides in
the completeness requirement. Clearly a GPT with
only one measurement for each observer always ad-
mits an equivalent HVT, which is the deterministic
one, since there is no requirement for parameter in-
dependence and λ-independence.
Generally, requiring 0 ≤ pij ≤ 1 and
∑
pij = 1
implies that p00, p01, p10 must lie in the tetrahe-
dron outlined in figure 1 (p11 is simply obtained
by the normalization condition). The spookiness
condition, namely Eq. (6), defines a hyperbolic
paraboloid, and all spooky theories give rise to
points of the tetrahedron that do not lie on the
surface of the paraboloid.
We now prove a theorem that along with Theo-
rem 1 provides the main result in this Letter. The
following theorem pertains to the property of steer-
ing [15, 16] for a GPT, that we briefly recall here.
Definition 6 (Steering state for an ensemble).
The state ρ of the system AB steers the ensemble
{piαi}i∈η of states of the system A if there exists a
test {bi}i∈η of the system B such that
ρ
?>
89
A
B *-+,bi
≡ pi  '!&αi A (∀i ∈ η) . (7)
Theorem 2. A GPT admits a steering state ρ for
a non trivial ensemble of two different states if and
only if the probabilities of ρ satisfy Eq. (6) for some
local test a, b.
Proof. Let us prove the two-way implication in two
steps.
(⇒). The steering assumption implies the exis-
tence of a state ρ for the composite system AB
which steers the marginal ensemble {p0α0, p1α1},
with 0 < p0, p1 < 1, p0+p1 = 1 and αi deterministic
states for A, such that (a0|α0) 6= (a0|α1) for some
effect a0. This last inequality implies that there ex-
ists 0 < |w| ≤ 1 such that (a0|α0) = (a0|α1)+w (or
equivalently (a1|α0) = (a1|α1)−w). Therefore, us-
ing the substitutions of Eq. (5), the RHS of Eq. (6)
p01p10 = p0p1(a0|α1)(a1|α0) can be rewritten as
p0p1{(a0|α0)(a1|α1)− w[(a0|α0) + (a1|α1)] + w
2}
= p0p1{(a0|α0)(a1|α1)− w}, (8)
where we used (a1|α1) = (a1|α0) + w and the nor-
malization (a0|α0) + (a1|α0) = 1. Since w 6= 0
and 0 < p0, p1 < 1, we conclude that the RHS of
Eq. (6) is not equal to p0p1(a0|α0)(a1|α1) = p00p11,
thus proving Eq. (6).
(⇐). Let us introduce for system A the (non-
deterministic) states α˜0, α˜1 defined as
(/).α˜i A := ρ
?>
89
A
B *-+,bi
(i = 0, 1) . (9)
Thanks to Eqs. (5,9), Eq. (6) can be rewritten as
follows
(a0|α˜0)(a1|α˜1) = (a0|α˜1)(a1|α˜0) + w, (10)
where 0 < |w| ≤ 1. It is useful to define the deter-
ministic states α0, α1 for system A such that
α˜i = (e|α˜i)αi (i = 0, 1) . (11)
Since {a0, a1} is a complete test, (a0|α˜i)+(a1|α˜i) =
(e|α˜i), for i = 0, 1, and from Eq. (10) we conclude
that (e|α˜0) and (e|α˜1) cannot be zero (otherwise
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w would be zero, against the hypothesis). Thus
Eq. (10) can be divided by (e|α˜0)(e|α˜1), obtaining
(a0|α0)(a1|α1) = (a0|α1)(a1|α0) +
w
(e|α˜0)(e|α˜1)
.
(12)
Using (a1|αi) = 1− (a0|αi), one has
(a0|α0) = (a0|α1) +
w
(e|α˜0)(e|α˜1)
. (13)
The last term of the RHS of the previous equation
is not equal to zero, since w 6= 0, thus we conclude
that (a0|α0) 6= (a0|α1). Since (e|α˜0), (e|α˜1) 6= 0, 1
the ensemble {(e|α˜0)α0, (e|α˜1)α1} is not trivial.
Finally, according to (9), and remembering that
b0, b1 constitute a complete test for system B, it
can be easily seen that the state ρ for the com-
posite system AB steers the non trivial ensemble
{(e|α˜0)α0, (e|α˜1)α1} thanks to effects b0, b1. 
As a natural consequence of Theorems 1 and 2,
we have the following corollary.
Corollary 1. For a complete GPT the conditions:
i) spookiness, ii) existence of a pure steering state
for a non-trivial ensemble, and iii) existence of a
pure state satisfying Eq. (6), are all equivalent.
Notice that completeness is always assumed in
our arguments (apart from Theorem 2). Indeed,
since the hyperbolic paraboloid of Fig. 1 includes
the four vertices of the tetrahedron, the probabili-
ties of a single couple of tests a = {a0, a1} for A and
b = {b0, b1} forB can always be thought of as a mix-
ture of factorized probabilities, and consequently
there could be in principle a descriptively signif-
icant HVT compatible with any such model. In
order to state stronger no-go theorems—like Bell’s
inequality—one must consider incompatible tests,
and the assumption of free will becomes crucial.
5. Complementarity and Schro¨dinger’s cat
From the results in the previous section the fol-
lowing corollary can be easily proved.
Corollary 2. A complete GPT with a pure steer-
ing state for a mixture of two states α0, α1 with α1
conclusively discriminable from α0 is spooky.
Before proving the last corollary, we precisely de-
fine when two states are probabilistically discrim-
inable.
Definition 7 (Conclusively discriminable states).
The state α1 is conclusively discriminable from the
state α0 if there exists an effect a such that (a|α0) =
0 and 0 < (a|α1) ≤ 1. If (a|α1) = 1 we say that α0,
α1 are perfectly discriminable.
Proof of the corollary. Two states α0, α1 with α1
conclusively discriminable from α0 provide a par-
ticular case of different states. Therefore we can
apply Theorem 2 and conclude that the probabili-
ties for the GPT must reside in the tetrahedron and
not on the hyperbolic paraboloid. Hence, according
to Theorem 1, the complete GPT is spooky. 
We will now show that complementarity–
along with steering–implies all variants of the
Schro¨dinger-cat paradox. The notion of comple-
mentarity has been the main focus of Bohr’s phi-
losophy of QT, however, it has been often criticized
for the lack of a precise mathematical formulation.
A definition of complementarity is provided in the
framework of quantum logic (see e. g. [23] and
references therein), however, it has never been de-
fined as a general notion outside QT. This is due
to the fact that complementarity regards contexts
that may seem unrelated, as wave-particle duality
and non-commutativity. Uncertainty and its quan-
titative relation with non-locality was analyzed in
Ref. [24]. Here we propose a notion of complemen-
tarity that summarizes all the aspects that emerge
within QT, and allows for a precise mathematical
formulation within the broader context of GPTs. In
order to do that, let us define what is a proposition
for a GPT.
Definition 8 (Proposition for a GPT). Given a
GPT, let a := {a0, a1} be a complete binary test.
The test a is a proposition if there exist two states
α0 and α1 such that (ai|αj) = δij.
We will call a state ρ sharp for a set of proposi-
tions {a(i)} if the probabilities for all effects of such
propositions are either zero or one. We can now
precisely formulate complementarity.
Definition 9 (GPT with Complementarity). A
GPT entails complementarity if there are two
propositions a(0) and a(1) having no common sharp
state. These propositions will be called complemen-
tary.
One may think that a more general definition
of complementarity involves a number N ≥ 2 of
propositions {a(i)}Ni=0 having no common sharp
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state. However, this is just equivalent to Defini-
tion 9, namely complementarity is an intrinsically
dual notion 4.
By the above definition the complementary
propositions cannot jointly have a definite truth
value. What is the paradox of the famous
Schro¨dinger’s cat argument [25]? In its popu-
larized version the paradox lies in the fact that
the cat pure state is a superposition |Ψ±〉 :=
2−
1
2 (|dead〉± |alive〉) before the measurement of its
state of life, thus coming from complementarity per
se (the test {|Ψ+〉〈Ψ+| , |Ψ−〉〈Ψ−|} is complemen-
tary to {|dead〉〈dead| , |alive〉〈alive|}. However, the
original paradox is subtler and relies on the ability
to remotely prepare orthogonal states for the cat.
Let us imagine for example that the state of life of
the cat is entangled with the spin of an electron as
in the state 2−
1
2 (|↑〉 ⊗ |alive〉+ |↓〉 ⊗ |dead〉). After
the measurement of the spin of the electron along
the z direction we have prepared the cat in the
states |dead〉 or |alive〉 each with probability 1/2.
The proposition corresponding to the life state of
the cat has a truth value that is conditioned by the
outcome of a measurement on the electron. This
situation by itself would not be puzzling if the state
were a mixture, as in the Bell’s argument of Bertl-
mann’s socks. The paradox is the fact that in a pure
state a definite property–the cat is alive–is neither
true nor false. This version of the paradox stems
from pure state steering of an ensemble of perfectly
discriminable states.
We now provide a third version of the para-
dox, which relies on the existence of a pure state
that steers an ensemble of sharp states for com-
plementary propositions. This is the case e.g.
of the state 2−
1
2 (|↑〉 ⊗ |alive〉 + |↓〉 ⊗ |Ψ+〉). Af-
ter the measurement of the spin of the electron
along the z direction we have prepared the cat
4Indeed, by hypothesis there exist N + 1 tests {a(i)}Ni=0
such that (a
(i)
j |ρ) = 1 =⇒ ∃k, l 0 < (a
(k)
l
|ρ) < 1. Let us
define the number k as the maximum number of the propo-
sitions a(i) for which there exists a state ρ such that each
proposition is deterministic, i.e.
Φ := {φ ⊆ {0, . . . , N}|∃ρ, ∀j ∈ φ ∃l : (a
(j)
l
|ρ) = 1},
k := max
Φ
|φ|.
By hypothesis, the number k is strictly less than N +1. Let
us take a set φ ∈ Φ for which |φ| = k, and let us define the
effects aj :=
1
k
∑
i∈φ a
(i)
j and a˜j := a
(l)
j with an arbitrary l /∈
φ. By construction, both tests a := {aj} and a˜ := {a˜j} are
propositions and have no common sharp state. The converse
is trivial.
in the states |alive〉 or 2−
1
2 (|dead〉 + |alive〉) each
with probability 1/2. In this case the outcome
of the measurement does not simply decide the
truth value of a proposition, but it even estab-
lishes which proposition has a definite truth value.
It is worth noticing that, according to Defini-
tion 9, the tests {|alive〉〈alive| , |dead〉〈dead|} and
{|Ψ+〉〈Ψ+| , |Ψ−〉〈Ψ−|} are complementary. Com-
plementarity and steering are thus the ingredients
for the third version of the paradox: given a GPT,
suppose that for a system A (the cat) there are two
complementary propositions a, a˜. By hypothesis
there are two sets of states {αi}, {α˜i} such that
(ai|αj) = (a˜i|α˜j) = δij , 0 < (ai|α˜j), (a˜i|αj) < 1. If
the theory has a pure steering state ρAB for the en-
semble {p0α0, p1α˜0} of the system A, thanks to our
corollary we conclude that the GPT is spooky, since
α˜0 (“alive”) is conclusively discriminable from α0
(Ψ+) by test a. We notice that the first version of
the paradox involves only complementary, the sec-
ond one involves only pure-state steering, whereas
the third one uses both. If the theory is complete,
the existence of a pure steering state for a perfectly
discriminable or complementary ensemble implies
spookiness, which is thus necessary for the second
and third version of the paradox.
6. Conclusion
We have shown that for a complete GPT spook-
iness and pure state steering of a non-trivial en-
semble are equivalent. Moreover, we thoroughly in-
troduced the notion of complementarity for GPTs,
and used it in order to discuss three different ver-
sions the Schro¨dinger cat paradox. A crucial ingre-
dient for all our results is completeness, namely the
property of a GPT consisting in the impossibility
of having descriptively significant HVTs. Classi-
cal probability theory is complete, and the same
has been recently proved also for QT [19]. In our
knowledge QT is the only theory satisfying the hy-
potheses of our theorems. Nevertheless, our re-
sult is relevant, due to its generality, and because
it highlights the interplay between two main fea-
tures of the theory–spookiness and existence of a
pure steering state–without recurring to the math-
ematical structure of Hilbert spaces, only relying
on the conceptual formalism of GPTs. The ques-
tion whether the theorem applies to a wider class
of theories opens a decisive new problem, namely
determining what GPTs are complete, and–if other
6
than Classical and Quantum–what are the common
features they enjoy.
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